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Résumé / Abstract
À l’aide d’un modèle formel d’économie politique avec information incomplète
concernant les activités de prévention d’accident choisies par l’entreprise (risque moral) à
responsabilité limitée, nous illustrons différentes conditions sous lesquelles un système de
protection environnementale reposant sur la responsabilité élargie aux financiers privés et
aux assureurs grâce à une assurance complète et obligatoire de la firme est supérieur,
inférieur ou équivalent en terme de bien-être social à un système reposant sur un mécanisme
de réglementation incitative sujet à la capture par les réglementés. Nous considérons
explicitement les facteurs suivants : le coût différentiel entre les niveaux faibles et élevés
d’activités de protection de l'environnement et les probabilités d'accidents qui leur sont
associées, le coût social des fonds publics, la rente informationnelle de l’entreprise, la
rentabilité nette des activités risquées, le niveau des dommages en cas d’accident et le facteur
de biais en cas de capture de l’agence de réglementation. Nous caractérisons, dans cet espace
de paramètres, les régions dans lesquelles un système domine l'autre.
Using a formal political economy model with incomplete information regarding the
accident preventing activities chosen by the firm (moral hazard) under limited liability, we
illustrate different conditions under which an environmental protection system based on
extending liability to private financiers or to insurers through compulsory full insurance of
the firm is welfare superior, inferior or equivalent to a system based on an incentive
regulatory scheme subject to capture by the regulatees. We consider explicitly the following
factors: the differential cost between low and high levels of environmental protection
activities and the associated accident probabilities, the social cost of public funds, the
informational rent of the firm, the net profitability of the risky activities, the level of damages
if an accident occurs, the bias factor in case of regulatory capture. We characterize in this
parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other.
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11 INTRODUCTION
The increasing importance of better understanding the choice between environmental policy
instruments in a political economy context comes from di®erent sources: the increasing di®usion
of risky activities in modern industrial societies, the necessity to properly compensate the victims
of accidents, the need to induce an e±cient level of care by the potential injurers, and the
increasingly stringent budgetary limits of cash-constrained governments.1
The choice of instruments deals in general with the ex ante policies on the one hand that regulate
the risky activities of ¯rms before an accident occurs such as safety standards, Pigouvian taxes,
marketable permits, and the ex post policies on the other hand that control the e®ect of an
accident and provide a set of rules to be applied once an accident has occurred such as emergency
civil protection plans and liability systems for clean-up costs and for the compensation of victims.
The two types of policies provide di®erent incentives for precautionary care and involve di®erent
costs.
We compare in this paper two broad stylized instruments. First, an assignment of strict liability
as de¯ned in the U.S. through CERCLA2 and in the E.C. through the White Paper3 and second,
a system of regulation rules and procedures enacted by an environmental protection authority
that can be subject to capture by the regulated ¯rms. To compare these two kinds of instruments
many features must be examined: the level of administrative expenses, the magnitude of the
damages in case of accident, the private knowledge of the parties regarding the causal factors of
accident probability and ¯nally the risk of capture or collusion.
The term \administrative expenses" in the case of a liability system refers to the cost of optimal
control of the probability of accidents, the legal expenses and the public expenses for maintaining
legal institutions; in the case of a regulation system it refers to the public costs of maintaining
1See for instance Menell (1991), Lewis (1996) and Segerson (1996).
2The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 1985, 1996. See
Pitchford (1995 and 2001), Boyer and La®ont (1996 and 1997), Boyer and Porrini (2001), Boyd and Ingberman
(1997), Lewis and Sappington (1999 and 2001), Balkenberg (2001).
3The White Paper on Environmental Liability of February 2000.
2the regulatory agencies and the private costs of compliance. One advantage of the liability
system is that a signi¯cant part of the administrative costs is incurred only if a suit occurs while
the administrative costs of a regulation system are incurred whether or not the harm occurs
because the process of regulation is costly by itself.
The second element of the comparison refers to the magnitude of damages and to the party
responsible for paying the clean-up and compensation costs of an accident. In a regulation
system, the damages are usually directly or indirectly covered by the public parties when due
care was exercised by the ¯rms according to the standards de¯ned by the regulatory agency. In
a liability regime, the damage costs are imposed on the responsible private parties, if and when
a suit occurs, given their capacity to pay and their limited liability.4 Both systems may require
some form of insurance: either a public fund in the case of the regulation system or a private
insurance contract in the case of a liability system.
A third element of the comparison is the distribution of knowledge and information among parties
regarding the bene¯ts of the ¯rm's activities, the cost of reducing risks and the probability and
the severity distribution of accidents. A liability system has the advantage of making the private
parties residual claimants of the control of risks when the nature of the activities carried out
by the ¯rms is such that the private parties have better knowledge of the bene¯ts and costs of
reducing risks. But, in other cases, the regulation authority can have better knowledge of those
risks because of the possibility of centralizing information and decisions, in particular when a
better knowledge of the risk factors requires a special expertise to be acquired through di®erent
cases and situations and shared among many parties.
A fourth relevant feature in the comparison is the possibility of capture and collusion. Both
the regulatory agencies and the courts may be in°uenced by external pressure by interested
parties. But it seems reasonable to consider that the courts are less likely to be captured than
the regulating agencies.
Given these di®erent elements, we can survey some contributions which have compared the two
4See Porrini (2001).
3di®erent broadly de¯ned instruments. Most of the time, the instruments are studied indepen-
dently as if the choice was between one or the other. We look at contributions which consider
the view that ex ante safety regulation and ex post liability of harms are not simply substi-
tutes but can be used, possibly in a more e±cient way, as complementary policies to face the
internalization issue.
2 COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN
LIABILITY AND REGULATION
Shavell (1984a, 1984b) compares the liability and safety regulation in terms of the incentives to
reduce the level of risk by exerting the socially desirable level of care. He considers generally that
neither regulation nor liability leads the parties to exercise the socially desirable level of care for
di®erent reasons: on the one hand, the regulatory authorities su®er from asymmetric information
problems about the risk and on the other hand, a liability system presents the possibility that
the parties would not pay fully for harm and would not even be sued. He considers the case
where either the liability system or the regulation system can be used and also the case where
both systems can be used jointly, considering that the parties must satisfy regulatory standards
and are also subject to liability. His conclusions are that it is generally socially advantageous
to use both liability and regulation because in this case the regulatory standard can be lower
than if regulation is used alone: liability is improving, in a sense, the e±ciency of the regulatory
system.
Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1999) stress that the two policies may be complements. A prelim-
inary consideration of the authors is that even if the phenomenon of complementary use of ex
ante and ex post regulatory policies is widespread, the economic literature has mainly studied
the two separately characterizing each of them by di®erent ine±ciencies, in particular coming
from the asymmetric distribution of information. For instance, the ex post liability system alone
is ine±cient insofar as the potential injurer is uncertain about whether the court will hold him
liable or not. They consider whether the liability system, applied jointly with ex ante regulation,
can correct the above ine±ciency, at least in part. In addition to the ine±ciencies considered by
4Shavell, namely the positive probability that the suit will never be brought against the injurer,
the limited resources and liability of the injurer to pay the damages, the imperfect knowledge
of the regulatory authorities regarding the magnitude of the damage, and the requirement of
one single level of care for all injurers, the authors consider the ine±ciency in the de¯nition of
legal standards which may lead to a di®erent level of precaution from the social optimal one
and from the one chosen by the ¯rms. The main conclusions are that when ex ante and ex post
policies are used jointly it is e±cient to set the regulatory standards at a level that is socially
sub-optimal compared with the one set in the case of the regulation system used alone.
In a recent paper, Schmitz (2000) criticizes the above papers which concluded for the comple-
mentary use of both ex ante regulation and ex post liability on the basis that both are imperfect.
He claims that although, as argued by Kolstand, Ulen and Johnson (1990), liability is ine±cient
because of the uncertainty regarding the courts' behavior, it is not clear why liability should be
used at all given that regulation by itself can always implement socially optimal behavior. In
Shavell (1984a), liability is ine±cient due to the injurers' limited wealth and regulation is also
ine±cient because the same regulatory standard applies to all injurers even if socially optimal
behavior varies among injurers: the suggestion of using liability and regulation as complemen-
tary instruments comes from the fact that the e±ciency of liability is limited due to enforcement
errors because injurers can escape suits and the magnitude of liability is determined at a subop-
timal level. But it seems unsatisfactory that a theory be based on the assumption that not only
the courts make mistakes, but that they make the same kind of errors persistently. Schmitz,
using a model closely related to Shavell's, shows ¯rst that if injurers cannot escape suit and if
the magnitude of liability is calculated at an optimal level, it can never be socially advantageous
to employ both liability and regulation as complementary instruments when all the injurers face
the same wealth constraints. But the joint use of liability and safety regulation can be optimal
under the assumption that wealth varies among injurers and in the latter case, the regulatory
standard can be set at a level that is lower than the one corresponding to the social optimum
when regulation is used alone.
Boyer, Lewis and Liu (2000) examines the further problem that optimal legal standards must
5simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and motivate law enforcers to detect violators
of the law because it is the threat of being ¯ned or punished that provides incentives to take
care. Recent experience reveals that it is di±cult for public o±cials to control the behavior
of enforcement agencies and this suggests that law enforcers need to be motivated to detect
violators, perhaps by rewarding them according to their success in discovering violations. In
such a setting the equilibrium interaction between potential o®enders and law enforcers will
determine how regulations are observed and enforced. The amount of e®ort enforcers exert will
depend on the perceived likelihood that parties have violated standards, and the likelihood of
violation will depend on how vigorously the law is enforced. In turn the behavior of o®enders
and enforcers will be shaped by the standards determining if a party has violated the law.
The strategic interaction between care providers and law enforcers determines the degree of
e±ciency achieved by the standards. The main ¯nding of Boyer, Lewis and Liu (2000) is that
some divergence between the marginal bene¯ts and marginal costs of providing care to prevent
accidents is required to control enforcement costs.5
Boyer and Porrini (2001) compare three incomplete information contexts in their analysis of the
choice of instruments in implementing an environmental protection policy. In the ¯rst context,
a benevolent regulator maximizes the proper social welfare function (the reference case). In
the second context, a private ¯nancier, that is an insurer or a banker, maximizes its own pro¯t
but is subject to extended liability if and when a ¯rm she ¯nances goes bankrupt following an
environmental accident. In the third context, a captured regulator, who bene¯ts from the ¯rm's
informational rent or pro¯t through bribes, perks and/or future employment opportunities, is
biased in her maximization of the social welfare function. In all three settings, the regulator
or ¯nancier can determine both the level of accident preventing care to be implemented by
submitting the ¯rm to an incentive contract and whether or not the risky activities themselves
should be allowed or not to operate or be ¯nanced. Boyer and Porrini show that a relatively large
cost di®erential between high and low levels of care, that is a high cost of accident preventing
activities, favors the `extended lender liability' regime. In this case, the `regulator subject to
capture' regime would end up inducing too much care, or too few environmental accidents, and
5See also Tiller and Spiller (1999) who analyze of judges or reviewers and agencies or enforcers in a context of
strategic decision making regarding the choice of instruments.
6allowing the ¯nancing of too many risky activities, that is an overdevelopment of environmentally
risky industries: the social value of the informational rents or pro¯ts so allowed are not large
enough in that case to compensate for the social cost of the extra care activities. They show also
that a relatively low cost of public funds, that is an e±cient non-distortionary taxation system,
favors the captured regulator regime. In that case, the `extended lender liability' regime would
end up inducing too little care, or too many environmental accidents, and allowing the ¯nancing
of too few risky activities, that is an underdevelopment of environmentally risky industries: the
bene¯t so created in terms of a reduced expected cost of environmental accidents are not large
enough in this case to compensate for the loss of pro¯ts (informational rents) whose social cost
is small when the cost of public funds is low.
In the present paper, we develop further the analysis of Boyer and Porrini (2001) by deriving
and discussing additional comparative statics results. We ¯rst recall in the next section the main
characteristics of our model: it is based on the stylized features of a liability system, extended to
lenders or covered by insurance contracts, and of a regulation system, that uses a fund ¯nanced
by taxation; in both cases, the informational problems between parties and the possibility of
capture are explicitly present. We characterize, in an incomplete information political economy
framework, the conditions under which the speci¯c incentive regulation approach we consider
is superior to the speci¯c extended liability approach in terms of social welfare, in particular in
terms of the level of precautionary activities and the level of investment in risky businesses and
therefore in terms of the probability of environmental accident.
The following factors in the comparison of the relative social e±ciency of the two di®erent
regimes are considered:
² the di®erential cost between low and high levels of environmental protection activities,
² the social cost of public funds due to distortionary taxation,
² the net pro¯tability, always positive, of the risky activities when the level of environmental
protection activities is high,
7² the net pro¯tability, positive or negative, of the risky activities when the level of environ-
mental protection activities is low,
² the level of damages if an accident occurs,
² and ¯nally the importance of the bias in the social welfare function in the case of regulatory
capture.
Using this model, di®erent combinations of those parameters will be analyzed and simulated in
order to characterize their multifactorial interactions in determining which regime, the extended
liability regime or the regulation subject to capture regime, is likely to be more e±cient in
implementing the environmental protection policy.
3 THE MODEL
It is useful to recall the main features of the model developed in Boyer and Porrini (2001).6 A
¯rm needs an amount F to invest in a single project. The project is assumed to generate either
a low level of net income ¼L or a high one ¼H with probability µ and 1 ¡ µ respectively, the
expected net income (before accounting for the expected cost of an accident and the cost of care)
being ¹¼ = µ¼L + (1 ¡ µ)¼H . The project is a risky project which can cause an accident with
damage d which if it occurred would make the ¯rm bankrupt, that is d > ¼H . The probability
of occurrence of such an accident depends on the ¯rm's accident preventing activities e and is
denoted by p(e). For matter of simplicity, the accident preventing activities e can be chosen
to be at a high level eh or at a low level e`, leading respectively to a probability of accident
ph and p`. Those activities are costly for the ¯rm; we denote the di®erential cost between the
high and low levels as ¢Ã, while normalizing the cost Ã` of the low level at 0. We assume that
the di®erential cost ¢Ã and the bene¯t of care in terms of a reduced probability of an accident
(p`¡ph)d are such that it is socially optimal in a full information ¯rst best sense that a high level
of accident preventing activities be exerted by the ¯rm. We assume without loss of generality
that the ¯rm must borrow the full amount of investment F .
6The model builds on the modelization of Boyer and La®ont (1997).
8We consider two regimes. In the ¯rst regime, the ¯rm interacts with a private ¯nancier, insurer or
banker, who is the residual liable party for the part of environmental damages above the value of
the ¯rm's assets. The ¯nancier is assumed to be a deep pocket institution (with a non-binding
limited liability) which maximizes its own pro¯t when dealing with the ¯rm.7 In the second
regime, the ¯rm interacts with a regulator who is responsible for implementing environmental
protection policies regarding both the accident preventing e®ort level and whether the ¯rm
should be allowed to operate or not, so in a sense to be ¯nanced of not.8 For simplicity, we assume
a direct ¯nancial link between the regulator and the ¯rm, as a reduced form representation of the
structural relationships between the regulator, the ¯rm and the ¯nancial markets. The regulator
maximizes welfare but may be subject to a form of capture by the regulated ¯rm. Under this
regulatory regime, the regulator takes into account in her complex relationships with the ¯rm
that the latter must be ¯nancially viable and that ¯nancial contracts have signi¯cant impacts
on the ¯rm's incentives to exert a high level of accident preventing activities.
We want to concentrate here on the di±culty for regulators and ¯nanciers to directly observe the
accident preventing activities of ¯rms. This relative di±culty to observe the way ¯rms choose
to prevent the occurrence of catastrophic accidents is a signi¯cant and realistic characteristic of
the challenging task of designing e±cient policies for proper environmental protection. Quite
often, the prevention and contingency plans are public and if not they are at least observable
by concerned parties but the daily implementation of those plans is not. This unobservability
of prevention and contingency plans or of their implementation is a major source of information
asymmetries between the external stakeholders and the ¯rm managers or owners and it imposes
signi¯cant constraints on the design and implementation of environmental policies. If those
constraints are not adequately taken into consideration, the policies will turn out to be either
socially too costly or ine±cient and unable to achieve the objectives pursued.
To take into account this feature of the environmental protection challenge, we consider the
following information structure: the realized pro¯t level is assumed to be observable by everyone
7Many authors have considered the topic of extended liability for environmental accidents. See among others
Pitchford (1995), Heyes (1996), Boyer and La®ont (1996), Boyd and Ingberman (1997).
8See among others Hahn (1990), La®ont (1995), Boyer and La®ont (1999).
9while the level of self-protection activities is assumed to be a private information of the ¯rm and
is therefore observable neither by the regulator, nor by the private ¯nancier. The relationships
between the regulator and the ¯rm and between the private ¯nancier are modeled in a principal-
agent framework. The timing of the interplay between the principal (either the public regulator
or the private banker or insurer) and the ¯rm is modeled as follows in both regimes considered.
The principal o®ers a ¯nancial contract to the ¯rm making explicit the payments to be made
if the ¯rm is ¯nanced; since the level of pro¯t is observable but the level of accident preventing
activities is not, the payments by the ¯rm will optimally depend on the level of pro¯ts9 but
not on the level of accident preventing activities. To make clearer the timing of payments and
the occurrence of an accident, we consider the model as a two-period model with the accident
preventing activities being implemented in period 1 and the accident occurring or not in period
2; the ¯rm project must be ¯nanced in each period and the probabilities of high and low pro¯t
levels remain the same in both periods. Once the investment is made, the accident preventing
activities level e is chosen and the project realized in period 1, then the pro¯t level is observed
and a payment is made to the principal according to the terms of the ¯nancial contract. Then in
period 2 the ¯rm is re¯nanced and invests F again, the pro¯t level is observed and an accident
occurs or not. A payment is made to the principal according to the ¯nancial contract and, if an
accident occurs, cleanup costs are distributed according to the system in force.
We will characterize and compare three solutions. The benchmark solution will correspond to
the case where a benevolent regulator, not subject to capture, decides whether or not the ¯rm
should operate, that is to be ¯nanced or not, and chooses directly the ¯nancial contract o®ered to
the ¯rm in order to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function in which the informational rent
of the ¯rm is properly accounted for. As mentioned above, this is meant to be a reduced form
representation of the complex relationships between the regulator, the ¯rm and the ¯nancial
markets. The second solution will be obtained when the decision whether the ¯rm should
operate or not is delegated to a private ¯nancier, banker or insurer who, under an extended
lender liability, decides to ¯nance or not the ¯rm and to o®er a ¯nancial and/or an insurance
contract that maximizes its own expected pro¯t function in which the informational rent of the
9Hence the ¯nancial contract will not be a standard loan contract.
10
¯rm is not present. The third solution will be obtained when the captured regulator decides
whether the ¯rm should operate or not and chooses the ¯nancial contract o®ered to the ¯rm:
the captured regulator maximizes a distorted social welfare function in which the informational
rent of the ¯rm will be overvalued by a factor K > 1.
The utilitarian social welfare function we use to compare the extended liability regime and
the regulation subject to capture regime contains three terms: a ¯rst term corresponds to the
expected net observable bene¯ts of the ¯rm's activities or project; a second term corresponds
to the expected cost of an accident (probability of accident times the amount of damage); a
third element corresponds to the informational rent or supra competitive pro¯t that the ¯rm
can capture or hide. The existence of the informational rent or supra competitive pro¯t comes
from the assumption that the level of the ¯rm's precautionary activities are not observable
(moral hazard) and from the net social value of nevertheless inducing proper care to reduce
the probability of an environmental accident. If this net social value is high enough, it will be
welfare enhancing to impose on the welfare maximization program an incentive compatibility
constraint. However, if this net social value is relatively low, then it may be better from a social
point of view not to induce a high level of accident preventing activities and to tolerate a higher
probability of accident when the ¯rm is nevertheless allowed to operate.
We assume the existence of a social cost of public funds ¸ due to distortionary taxation in the
economy.10 The observable pro¯t of the ¯rm could be used to reduce the general distortionary
taxes and will thus enter the social welfare function with a weight of (1+¸) to explicitly represent
its social value, that is its potential social value. Similarly, the expected cost of an accident enters
the social welfare function with a weight of (1+¸) because the government will have to cover that
cost one way or another, either directly or through the taxation rules (tax deductible expenses
for cleaning up the polluted areas and/or for compensating the victims, for instance). Finally,
the informational rent that the ¯rm can capture or hide cannot be used, even potentially, to
reduce distortionary taxation because it is not observed and will thus enter the social welfare
10There is a large literature on this complex problem. For a balanced view, the reader is referred to the following
sources: Pigou (1947), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Ballard and Fullerton (1992) and Kaplow (1996). Jones,
Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) derive estimates indicating that ¸ is of the order of 0.3 in developed countries and
higher in developing ones.
11
function with a weight of 1 to properly represent its utilitarian (private) value. The existence
of a social cost of public funds is an important and realistic feature of regulatory framework
and social welfare accounting: as we will see, it will lead under some conditions to distortions
in the accident preventing e®ort levels and to distortions also in the decision to ¯nance or not
the ¯rm's risky activities, so to allow those activities.
4 AN INTUITIVE DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
In a complete information context, the ¯rst best solution is feasible and entails a high level
of precautionary activities and the ¯nancing of the ¯rm's risky activities under the condition
that, given the high level of e®ort, the expected net income minus the ¯xed investment cost, the
expected cost of the accident and the cost of accident preventing activities, is positive or at least
non-negative, a condition that is met by assumption. This full information ¯rst best solution
is achieved if we have a benevolent regulator or a captured regulator because even if the two
regulators di®er by their treatment of the ¯rm's informational rent, the rent is zero under full
information. With extended liability of a deep pocket private bank or an insurer as ¯nancier,
the full information ¯rst best allocation is also achieved at the Nash equilibrium of the game
played by the ¯rm and the ¯nancier since the extended lender liability or the full insurance
contract make both the banker and the insurer internalize the full expected cost of an accident
and therefore implement the social welfare maximizing solution.
Under an asymmetric information structure and with limited liability of the ¯rm, the internal-
ization of externalities becomes a more di±cult problem. The social optimum corresponds to
the maximization of the social welfare function under the following conditions or constraints:
the incentive compatibility constraint requiring that the ¯rm be induced to choose an high level
of precautions which in general implies that a costly rent be left to the ¯rm; the limited liabil-
ity of the ¯rm requiring that the repayment levels not exceed the corresponding pro¯t levels;
the individual rationality constraint of the privately informed ¯rm stating that the ¯rm's ex-
pected pro¯t cannot be negative. Under limited liability, if the accident occurs, the ¯rm will
12
be judgment-proof11 for damages above its pro¯t level, so moral hazard variables cannot be
simply and costlessly controlled by imposing appropriate penalties on the risk neutral ¯rm and
the latter will in general be able to capture an informational rent.
The rent the ¯rm can obtain because of its superior information on its own accident preventing
activities is given by the di®erence between its expected pro¯t when it is not induced to exert
a high level of care and its expected pro¯t when it is so induced. Because of the social cost of
public funds, it will be welfare enhancing to make this rent as small as possible by adjusting
the payments stipulated in the ¯nancial contract such that the rent is minimized under that
condition that the contract be incentive compatible. Boyer and Porrini (2001) show that this
rent R (net of the cost ¢Ã of exerting a high level of care) is given by12
R ´ (1 ¡ ph) ¢Ãp` ¡ ph ¡ ¢Ã:
Under moral hazard (non-observability of precautionary activities), the social optimum, cor-
responding to the benevolent regulator solution, is characterized by a high level of accident
preventing activities if and only if the net social cost of the ¯rm's informational rent plus the
di®erential cost of precautionary activities is less than or equal to the di®erence in the expected
cost of an accident under the high and the low levels of precautionary activities. Financing oc-
curs then if the net social value of the ¯rm's activities under full information is larger than the
net social cost of the ¯rm's informational rent (rather than simply larger than 0, as in the ¯rst
best full information context). This social optimum under moral hazard rule di®ers from the
¯rst best full information rule because of the presence of the informational rent to be given up
to the ¯rm when the benevolent regulator wants to induce a high level of care. The benevolent
regulator cannot avoid giving up that rent to induce a high level of care and will therefore take
into account the net social cost of that rent in deciding if the ¯rm should be allowed to operate
or not and in deciding what level of accident preventing activities should be implemented. If
that net social cost of the rent is large, the benevolent regulator may prefer, in maximizing
11See Summers (1983) and Shavell (1986).
12Incentive compatibility requires that the ¯rm gains in exerting a high level of care, that is, letting EP be the
expected payments made by the ¯rm under the ¯nancial contract, (1 ¡ ph)(¹¼ ¡ EP ) ¡¢Ã ¸ (1 ¡ p`)(¹¼ ¡ EP )
implying that EP · ¹¼ ¡¢Ã=(p` ¡ ph). Substituting the latter into the former we obtain that the rent the ¯rm
can get when induced to exert the high level of care is (1¡ ph)(¢Ã=(p` ¡ ph))¡¢Ã.
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social welfare, to induce a low level of accident preventing activities, generating thereby a high
probability of environmental accidents. It may even turn out that the benevolent regulator
will prevent the ¯rm from operating or being ¯nanced even if the ¯rm's activities or project is
socially valuable under full information.
Under an extended lender liability framework or under a compulsory full insurance contract, the
principal is either a private banker or a private insurer. As in the benevolent regulator case, the
full expected cost of an accident is properly internalized given that the banker or the insurer is
the residual claimant of that cost. The di®erence is in the treatment of the ¯rm's informational
rent, which appears only when the high level of e®ort is induced. Hence, the comparison between
the two solutions rests on their di®erent evaluation of the ¯rm's rent when a high level of care is
induced. For the private ¯nancier, banker or insurer, the cost of the rent is equal to the amount
of the rent itself while for the benevolent regulator the net cost is smaller because she considers
the social value of that rent in the social welfare function. This makes the private ¯nancier
less willing than the benevolent regulator to lend and less willing also to induce a high level of
accident preventing activities. Hence this undervaluation of the social value (overvaluation of
its cost) of the ¯rm's unavoidable informational rent leads to insu±cient ¯nancing and too little
care activities induced by the bank or the insurer as compared with the solution a benevolent
regulator would choose to implement. If the banker or the insurer chooses to let the ¯rm exert
a low level of care in preventing accidents, there will be no rent and therefore the bank lends as
often as the benevolent regulator would in that case. Hence, an extended lender liability or full
(strict) insurance regime will generate a welfare cost because of insu±cient ¯nancing of risky
activities and of inducing high care levels not often enough.
Because the captured regulator overvalues the ¯rm's informational rent in her version of the
social welfare function, due to her indirect interests in the ¯rm's informational rent or pro¯t,
and because this informational rent is obtained by the ¯rm only when it is induced to choose
the high level of accident preventing activities, the captured regulator induces a high level of
accident preventing activities more often than the benevolent regulator does. When she induces
a high level of care conceding a rent to the ¯rm, she also lends more often than called for by
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the second best optimal investment rule again because she overvalues the ¯rm's rent or pro¯t in
its objective function. The net social cost of the ¯rm's informational rent or supra competitive
pro¯t is undervalued by the captured regulator and therefore, the capture of the regulator leads
to overcare and to overinvestment in the case of high level of care as compared with the solution
a benevolent regulator would choose to implement. When a low level of care is induced, then
no rent is left to the ¯rm and the investment rules of the captured regulator and the benevolent
regulator are the same. Hence, a regulation subject to capture regime will generate a welfare
cost because it leads to ¯nancing of risky activities too much and to inducing high levels of
accident preventing activities too often. A formal presentation of the results is given in the
Appendix.
5 A GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CHOICE OF
INSTRUMENTS
We can compare the two regimes considered, the extended liability regime and the regulation
subject to capture regime, by referring to the following illustrative ¯gures. In those ¯gures, BR
stands for the solution (the investment rule, that is allowing the ¯rm to operate or not, and the
level of accident preventing activities) implemented by the \benevolent regulator", CR stands
for the solution implemented by the \captured regulator" and \PF" stands for the solution
implemented by the \private ¯nancier, banker or insurer". The ¯ve graphs presented here are
only some of the graphs one could look at but they are illustrative of what results can be derived
under a formal analysis of the choice of instruments in implementing a set of environmental policy
objectives.
In each ¯gure, the numbers associated with the di®erent curves or lines correspond to the
equation numbers in the Appendix. We indicate by ©1 the region, in the particular parameter
space represented by the coordinates, where both the extended liability or full insurance regime
and the regulation subject to capture regime are equivalent to the benevolent regulator in the
sense that they induce a high level of accident preventing activities and implement the same
investment or ¯nancing rule. Hence, in that region, both regimes are equivalent and generate no
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welfare loss. We indicate by ©2 the region where again both the extended liability regime and the
regulation subject to capture regime are equivalent to the benevolent regulator in the sense that
they induce a low level of accident preventing activities and implement the same investment or
¯nancing rule. Hence, in that region, both regimes are again equivalent and generate no welfare
loss. In regions - and ¡, the two regimes di®ers, the regulation subject to capture regime being
welfare superior to the extended liability or full insurance regime in region - and welfare inferior
in region ¡.
Let us consider Figure 1. The case depicted in this ¯gure is such that the project is valuable
even if the low level of accident preventing activities is exerted, that is (3) is satis¯ed. Hence
the ¯rm will always be allowed to operate or be ¯nanced. In region -, the regulation subject
to capture regime is equivalent to the benevolent regulator in the sense that both induce a high
level of accident preventing activities and both let the ¯rm operate. Hence, in that region,
the regulation subject to capture regime implements the social welfare maximizing solution and
therefore generate no welfare loss. However, in that region, the ¯rm is always ¯nanced under
the extended liability or full insurance regime but with a low level of accident preventing ac-
tivities and therefore generate a welfare loss: there would be too many environment damaging
accidents. In region ¡, the extended liability or full insurance regime is equivalent to the benev-
olent regulator in the sense that both induce a low level of accident preventing activities and
both let the ¯rm operate or be ¯nanced. Hence, in that region, the extended liability or full
insurance regime implements the social welfare maximizing solution and therefore generate no
welfare loss. However, in that region, the regulation subject to capture regime always ¯nances
the ¯rm but it induces a high level of accident preventing activities and therefore generate a
welfare loss: it would imply too few environment damaging accidents. In this region, the welfare
maximizing solution calls for a low level of accident preventing care because the social cost of
the informational rent that the ¯rm can obtain if asked to exert a high level of care is too high.
It is better, from a social welfare point of view, to tolerate a higher probability of accident
with no informational rent for the ¯rm than to reduce the probability of accident together with
abandoning a costly rent to the ¯rm.
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Insert Figure 1 here
Suppose that in Figure 1 the net social opportunity cost of public funds is ¸ = 0:6. Then,
as the di®erential cost between the high and low levels of accident preventing activities ¢Ã
increases, we go from region ©1 where both regimes are equivalent and generate no welfare loss
to region - where, once (4) is crossed, the private ¯nancier would ¯nd unpro¯table to induce
the ¯rm to exert a high level because with a higher ¢Ã the rent to be abandon to the ¯rm
becomes too large. In spite of extended liability and therefore of the full internalization of the
expected cost of an accident, the private ¯nancier ¯nds more pro¯table to let the probability of
accident be relatively large. In that region the regulation subject to capture is preferred. But
for a larger value of ¢Ã, we move into region ¡ where the social optimum under moral hazard
calls for a low level of accident preventing e®ort and no rent because the otherwise unavoidable
rent increases with the di®erential cost of care. However, because the captured regulator has
a vested interest in keeping the ¯rm's rent or pro¯t high, and since this rent is obtained only
if a high level of e®ort is induced, she keeps inducing the ¯rm to exert a high level of e®ort
to reduce the probability of environmental accidents. But in so doing, she moves away from
the social optimum which calls in this region ¡ for the elimination of the rent at the expense
of a higher probability of accident. In that region, the investment and e®ort policies of the
private ¯nancier and the benevolent regulator coincide and therefore the extended liability or
full insurance regime is preferred. As the di®erential cost ¢Ã increases even more, we move into
region ©2 where the rent level becomes so high that even the captured regulator opt, as well as
the private ¯nancier regime, for letting the ¯rm operate at a low level of e®ort but with no rent.
Let us now suppose that the di®erential cost between the high and low levels of accident pre-
venting activities ¢Ã is ¯xed at the 0.5 level. As the social cost of public funds ¸ increases
from 0 to 1, we move successively into regions -, ¡ and ©2. When the value of ¸ becomes large
enough to cross the boundary (1) { note that this occurs earlier for larger values of ¢Ã { the
cost of the rent that the captured regulator would leave to the ¯rm becomes too high and it is
better to opt for the private ¯nancier extended liability or full insurance regime which leaves no
rent to the ¯rm: the higher probability of accident with the private ¯nancier regime is better,
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from a social welfare point of view, than the larger rent with the captured regulator regime.
Hence, Figure 1 shows that \larger" values of the social opportunity cost of public funds { above
(1) { favors the private ¯nancier extended liability or full insurance regime as the preferred
instrument, while \lower" values of the di®erential cost between the high and low levels of
accident preventing activities { to the left of (1) { favors the regulation subject to capture
regime as the preferred instrument to implement the socially optimal environmental policy both
in terms of allowing (and ¯nancing) or not the ¯rm to operate and in terms of the level of
accident preventing activities.
Let us consider Figure 2. In the case depicted in this ¯gure we consider the same variable
parameters (coordinates) as in Figure 1 and the same ¯xed values for the other parameters
except for the probability of accident under a low level of care p` which is now set at 0.3 rather
than 0.1; this higher probability of accident when the ¯rm exerts a low level of care implies that
the ¯rm project is not socially valuable under full information when the low level of accident
preventing activities is exerted. We now ¯nd that in region -^, the private ¯nancier solution calls
for not ¯nancing the ¯rm: under extended liability or full insurance, the no rent solution with
a low level of accident preventing activities is not pro¯table for the private ¯nancier. But the
social optimum under moral hazard calls for letting the ¯rm operate and be induced to exert a
high level of care. The captured regulator will implement such a solution and is therefore the
preferred instrument in this region. In spite of the fact that there will be more environment
damaging accident with the captured regulator regime than with the private ¯nancier regime, it
is socially optimal to face the risk of such accidents. However, as we move into region ¡^, either
because of a higher level of the social cost of public funds ¸ or a higher di®erential cost between
the high and low level of accident preventing activities, the social optimum is to prevent the
¯rm from operating while the captured regulator would rather let it operate with a high level
of e®ort to generate an informational rent in which she has some interest. In this region, the
private ¯nancier is the preferred instrument: the rent captured by the ¯rm under a high level of
e®ort is too large (higher ¢Ã) or too costly (higher ¸) compared to the social value of the ¯rm
or project to justify its operation. As in region -^, there will be more environment damaging
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accident with the captured regulator regime than with the private ¯nancier regime, but now the
social cost of the unavoidable rent has become too large to make it socially pro¯table to face
the risk of such accidents.
Insert Figure 2 here
Let us suppose as before that the net social opportunity cost of public funds is ¸ = 0:6. Then,
as the di®erential cost between eh and e` goes up, we move from the region where neither the
private ¯nancier regime nor the captured regulator regime generate any welfare loss to region
-^ where, once (5) is crossed, the private ¯nancier would ¯nd unpro¯table to ¯nance the ¯rm.13
In that region the regulation subject to capture is preferred. But for a larger discrepancy cost,
we move into region ¡^ where the social optimum under moral hazard calls for not ¯nancing the
¯rm. However, because the captured regulator has a vested interest in keeping the ¯rm's rent
or pro¯t high, and since this rent is obtained only if a high level of e®ort is induced and the ¯rm
is in operation, she keeps letting the ¯rm operate and inducing it to exert a high level of e®ort
to reduce the probability of environmental accidents. But in so doing, she moves away from
the social optimum which calls in this region ¡^ for preventing the ¯rm from operating. In that
region, the investment policies of the private ¯nancier and the benevolent regulator coincide
and therefore the extended liability or full insurance regime is preferred. As the di®erential cost
increases even more, we move into region ©^2 where the rent level becomes so high that even the
captured regulator opt, as well as the private ¯nancier, for not ¯nancing the ¯rm and therefore
neither generate a welfare loss.
Let us now suppose that the di®erential cost ¢Ã is ¯xed at the 2.5 level. As the social cost of
public funds increases from 0 to 1, we move successively into regions -^, ¡^ and ©^2. When the
13We consider a strict liability regime with the banker or insurer fully liable for damages above the ¯rm's assets.
In some cases, a partial liability system, as discussed by Boyer and La®ont (1997), may be better if there is some
room to maneuver between the need to induce the private ¯nancier to monitor the ¯rm and provide it with the
incentives to exert a high level of e®ort and the need to ¯nance the ¯rm whenever it is socially valuable to do so.
In Figure 2, making the private ¯nancier partially liable would move (4) to the left and (5) to the right and lead
to a welfare improvement. Similarly, under a negligence rule, as discussed by Pfa® and Sanchirico (2000), the
`integrated organization', that is the private ¯nancier together with the ¯rm, may ¯ned too heavily for violations
of the regulations as compared to an optimal ¯ne level which could be a decreasing function of the organization's
monitoring and disclosure rules and e®orts.
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value of ¸ becomes large enough to cross the boundary (2) { note that again this occurs earlier
for larger values of ¢Ã { the cost of the rent that the captured regulator would leave to the ¯rm
by letting it operate and inducing a high level of accident preventing activities becomes too high
and it is better to opt for the private ¯nancier regime which will not ¯nance the ¯rm at all: the
no ¯nancing solution of the private ¯nancier regime is now better, from a social welfare point of
view, than letting the ¯rm operate even with a high level of accident preventing activities which
the captured regulator regime would imply.
Hence, when the ¯rm project is socially valuable only if a high level of care is exerted, Figure
2 shows that \larger" values of the social opportunity cost of public funds { above (2) { favors
the private ¯nancier regime as the preferred instrument, while \lower" values of the di®erential
cost between the high and low levels of accident preventing activities { to the left of (2) { favors
the regulation subject to capture regime as the preferred instrument to implement the socially
optimal environmental policy both because it would allow the ¯rm to operate, contrary to the
private ¯nancier regime, and because it would induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of accident
preventing activities.
Let us now consider Figure 3 where the social cost of public funds is ¯xed at 0.3 and the variable
parameters are now the di®erential cost between high and low levels of accident preventing
activities as before and the cost of an accident d. It should be stressed that we do not assume
a distribution function for d. The level of damages if an accident occurs remains ¯xed but we
consider di®erent levels of this ¯xed value between ¼H and 50. The parameter values of this
case are otherwise the same as in Figure 1 and therefore the ¯rm project is valuable under a
low level of care. The regions ©1, -, ¡ and ©2 have the same interpretation as before: the two
regimes are equivalent instruments in ©1 and ©2, the regulation subject to capture is preferred
in region - and the private ¯nancier extended liability or full insurance regime is preferred in
region ¡. The ¯rm is ¯nanced in all regions but the level of accident preventing activities di®er
between regions and regimes.
Insert Figure 3 here
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Let us now suppose that the di®erential cost between the high and low levels of care ¢Ã is ¯xed
at the 0.1 level. As the cost of an accident d increases from ¼H = 10 to 50, we move successively
into regions ©2, ¡, - and ¯nally ©1. For relatively low values of d, it is socially preferable to
let the ¯rm operate with a low level of accident preventing activities, the reason being that the
expected cost of an accident is not high enough to justify the social cost of the informational
rent or supra competitive pro¯t the ¯rm would enjoy if the principal wants to induce it to exert
a high level of care. Both regimes considered implement the social optimum under moral hazard
and therefore neither generate a welfare cost. When the value of d becomes large enough to
cross the boundary (6) { note that this occurs later for larger values of ¢Ã since a larger ¢Ã
means a larger informational rent { the expected cost of an accident becomes large enough for
the captured regulator to prefer inducing the ¯rm to choose a high level of care, allowing it
to get an informational rent, even if the social optimum still calls for not doing so. In region
¡, the private ¯nancier remains unwilling to abandon a rent to the ¯rm and prefers, as the
benevolent regulator does, to ¯nance the ¯rm and face the higher probability of an accident.
Hence the private ¯nancier implements the social optimum under moral hazard solution and
is therefore the preferred instrument: the higher probability of accident with no informational
rent is better, from a social welfare point of view, than the lower probability of accident with
a positive informational rent under the captured regulator regime. As d increases more and
crosses the boundary (1), the larger cost of an accident now justi¯es that the ¯rm be induced to
exert a high level of care even if that implies a positive rent or higher pro¯t for the ¯rm { note
that this occurs later for larger values of the di®erential cost between the high and low level of
care. However, the private ¯nancier still prefers not to induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of
accident preventing activities and face the higher risk of an accident for which she is the residual
liable party. In region -, the captured regulator implements the social optimum under moral
hazard and is therefore the preferred instrument: the lower probability of an accident obtained in
the captured regulator regime at the cost of an informational rent or a supra competitive pro¯t
for the ¯rm is better than the higher probability of accident with no rent which the private
¯nancier regime would implement. Finally, when the value of d goes over boundary (4) which
is also increasing with ¢Ã, the cost of an accident is now high enough that both regimes prefer
to induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of care as the benevolent regulator does and therefore
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neither generate a welfare loss.
Let us suppose now that the cost of an accident is ¯xed at 30. Then, as the di®erential cost
between eh and e` goes up, we move from the region ©1 where both the private ¯nancier regime
and the captured regulator regime induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of care and therefore
neither generate any welfare loss to region - where, once (4) is crossed, the private ¯nancier
would ¯nd unpro¯table to induce a high level of care anymore because the level of the rent
necessary to achieve this is now too high. In that region the regulation subject to capture is
preferred. But for a larger discrepancy cost, we move into region ¡ where the social optimum
under moral hazard calls for a low level of accident preventing activities. However, because the
captured regulator has a vested interest in keeping the ¯rm's rent or pro¯t high, and since this
rent is obtained only if a high level of e®ort is induced, she keeps inducing the ¯rm to exert
a high level of e®ort to reduce the probability of environmental accidents. But the investment
policies and prevention policies of the private ¯nancier and the benevolent regulator coincide
and therefore the extended liability or full insurance regime becomes the preferred instrument.
As the di®erential cost increases even more, we move into region ©2 where the rent level becomes
so high that even the captured regulator opt, as well as the private ¯nancier, for a low level of
care and therefore neither generate a welfare loss.
Figure 3 shows that more costly accidents favors the captured regulator regime over the private
¯nancier extended liability or full insurance regime and that the level of d at which the switch
occurs depends on the di®erential cost ¢Ã: the higher this di®erential cost, the higher the
critical value of d.
Let us now consider Figure 4 where the variable parameters or the coordinates are now the social
opportunity cost of public funds and the capture factor K. The cost of an accident is ¯xed at 20
and the di®erential cost between the high and low levels of accident preventing activities is ¯xed
at 0.6 and the other parameters are ¯xed at their levels in Figure 3 and therefore the ¯rm project
is valuable under a low level of care. The regions ©1, -, ¡ and ©2 have the same interpretation
as before. Hence, the ¯rm is always ¯nanced the level of accident preventing activities di®er
between regions and regimes. Note however that the region ©1 where the ¯rm would be induced
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to exert a high level of care in all regimes is empty in Figure 4.
Insert Figure 4 here
Let us suppose that the capture factor K is ¯xed at the 1.2 level. As the social opportunity
cost of public funds ¸ increases from 0 to 1, we move successively into regions -, ¡ and ¯nally
©2. For relatively low values of ¸, it is socially preferable to induce the ¯rm to choose a high
level of accident preventing activities, the reason being that the social cost of the informational
rent is rather small. But only the captured regulator is willing to induce the ¯rm to behave
that way. The private ¯nancier prefers the ¯rm to operate under a low level of care because
the level of the rent to be abandoned to the ¯rm is otherwise too large. Hence, the regulation
subject to capture regime is preferred. As the value of ¸ increases and crosses boundary (1),
the social cost of the informational rent increases and the social optimum under moral hazard
now calls for a low level of care with no supra competitive pro¯t for the ¯rm. However, the
level of ¸ is still not too high, between boundaries (1) and (6), so that the captured regulator
prefers to induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of care, the reason being that the captured
regulator has a vested interest in the supra competitive pro¯t of the ¯rm and that the rent
is considered by the captured regulator as not too costly as long as ¸ is below boundary (6).
Hence in this region, the private ¯nancier under extended liability or compulsory full insurance
is preferred: the higher probability of accident is better from a social welfare point of view to the
supra competitive pro¯t the ¯rm would be able to obtain with a high level of accident preventing
activities. Finally, as ¸ becomes relatively large, the social cost of the informational rent becomes
too high and even the captured regulator prefers to let the ¯rm operate with a low level of care.
In region ©2, both regimes considered are equivalent and there are no welfare loss with either of
them. It is interesting to note that boundary (1), at which the preferred instrument or regime
switches from the regulation subject to capture to the private ¯nancier one, is independent of
the capture factor K whereas boundary (6), at which the captured regulator ceases to induce
the ¯rm to choose a high level of accident preventing activities and thus implements again the
social optimum under moral hazard, is increasing with K.
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Let us now suppose that the social opportunity cost of public funds ¸ is ¯xed at the 0.3 level.
Then, as the capture factor K increases from 1 to 2, we move successively into regions ©2 and ¡,
the other regions of interest ©1 and - being empty in Figure 4. For low values of K, it is socially
preferable to let the ¯rm operate with a low level of accident preventing activities, the reason
being that the social cost of the informational rent, which is independent of K, is relatively large
given that ¸ is at 0.3 and ¢Ã is at the 0.6 level. Both the captured regulator and the private
¯nancier are unwilling to induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of care and therefore neither
generate a welfare loss. As the capture of the regulator becomes more important, that is as K
increases above the boundary (6) { this happens later for larger values of ¸ { we move into region
¡ where the captured regulator is now willing to induce the ¯rm to choose a high level of e®ort,
reducing the probability of an accident but letting the ¯rm obtain a costly informational rent.
In so doing, the captured regulator moves away from the social optimum under moral hazard
while the private ¯nancier remains unwilling to induce a high level of care. The private ¯nancier
under extended liability or compulsory full insurance becomes the preferred instrument.
Let us now consider Figure 5 where the two variable parameters or coordinates are the social
opportunity cost of public funds ¸ and the probability of the low level of pro¯t µ. The cost
of an accident is ¯xed at 20, the di®erential cost between the high and low levels of accident
preventing activities is ¯xed at 0.6 and the capture factor is ¯xed at 1.2 as before. The ¯rm
project is valuable under a low level of care if and only if the probability of the low level of
pro¯t µ is below 0.8; for µ > 0:8, condition (3) is not satis¯ed. The regions ©1 and ©^1 are
empty in Figure 5 and the regions -, ¡ and ©2 together with -^, ¡^ and ©^2 have the same
interpretation as before. In - and -^, the regulation subject to capture regime is the preferred
instrument because in this region of the parameter space the private ¯nancier prefers, if µ · 0:8,
to ¯nance the ¯rm with a low level of accident preventing activities because otherwise the level
of the informational rent is too high or, if µ > 0; 8, to not ¯nance the ¯rm at all, while the
captured regulator implements the social optimum under moral hazard by allowing the ¯rm to
operate while inducing it to exert a high level of care. In region ¡ and ¡^, the private ¯nancier
with extended liability or full compulsory insurance regime is the preferred regime because in
these regions, the private ¯nancier implements the social optimum under moral hazard: either,
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if (¸; µ) 2 ¡, by ¯nancing the ¯rm but with a low level of care or, if (¸; µ) 2 ¡^, by not ¯nancing
the ¯rm. In ¡ and ¡^, the captured regulator allows the ¯rm to operate and induces it to exert a
high level of e®ort and in so doing moves away from the social optimum under moral hazard. In
region ©2 and ©^2, both regimes, the captured regulator regime and the private ¯nancier regime,
implement the social optimum under moral hazard which calls in ©2 for ¯nancing the ¯rm or
allowing it to operate with a low level of accident preventing activities and in ©^2 for not allowing
the ¯rm to operate.
Insert Figure 5 here
Let us suppose that the probability of the low level of pro¯t is ¯xed at the 0.6 level. As the social
opportunity cost of public funds ¸ increases from 0 to 1, we move successively into regions -, ¡
and ¯nally ©2, a case similar to the one discussed in Figure 4 except that in the present case,
boundary (6) is the same for all values of µ 2 (0; 0:8]. Let us suppose now that the probability of
the low level of pro¯t is ¯xed at the 0.82 level. As the social opportunity cost of public funds ¸
increases from 0 to 1, we move successively into regions -^, ¡^ and ¯nally ©^2. When the value of ¸
crosses boundary (2), the ¯rm project ceases to be socially valuable. Under full information, the
¯rm project would be socially valuable only if the ¯rm exerts a high level of accident preventing
activities but under incomplete information (moral hazard) it ceases to be socially valuable even
with a high level of care because of the social cost of the unavoidable informational rent: it is
then better to prevent the ¯rm from operating which is what the private ¯nancier would end
up doing by refusing to ¯nance the ¯rm in that region of parameter space. However, because
of her indirect interest in the ¯rm's supra competitive pro¯t, the captured regulator would still,
in region ¡^, ¯nance the ¯rm and induce it to exert a high level of care, thereby implementing
the full information ¯rst best optimum but not the social optimum under moral hazard which
calls for shutting down the ¯rm: because of the social opportunity cost of public funds, income
distribution matters and it is no more su±cient that the ¯rst best be attained. As the social
opportunity cost of public funds increases above boundary (7), the captured regulator then ¯nds
the social cost of the informational rent too high and ceases to allow the ¯rm to operate, thereby
implementing, as well as the private ¯nancier regime, the social optimum under moral hazard.
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Let us now suppose that the social opportunity cost of public funds ¸ is ¯xed at the 0.03 level.
Then, as the probability of the low level of pro¯t µ increases toward 1, we are successively in
regions -, -^ ©^2. For low values of µ, that is for a ¯rm project with a large expected pro¯t level,
it is socially preferable to let the ¯rm operate and to induce it to choose a high level of accident
preventing activities, the reason being that the social cost of the informational rent, which is
independent of µ, is relatively low given that ¸ is at 0.03 and ¢Ã is at the 0.6 level. That is
the policy the captured regulator would then implement contrary to the private ¯nancier who
would prefer to ¯nance the ¯rm with a low level of care in order to avoid paying the unavoidable
rent if a high level of care is induced. Hence the captured regulator is the preferred regime. As
µ increases, the ¯nancial pro¯tability ¹¼ of the project decreases, and we eventually move into
region -^ where the ¯rm/project is socially valuable only if a high level of care is induced. Since
the private ¯nancier would not ¯nance the ¯rm in -^, the captured regulator which implements
the social optimum under moral hazard is the preferred regime. When the value of µ crosses
boundary (2), the ¯rm ceases to be socially pro¯table whatever the level of care { this occurs
later for smaller values of the social opportunity cost of public funds { and the social optimum
calls for preventing the ¯rm from operating. However, because of her interest in the ¯rm's supra
competitive pro¯t, the captured regulator keeps allowing the ¯rm to operate and inducing a high
level of e®ort, making the private ¯nancier under extended liability or compulsory full insurance
the preferred instrument. Eventually, as µ increases even more, we move into region ©^2 and
both regimes implement the social optimum under moral hazard and the ¯rm is not ¯nanced.
6 CONCLUSION
We compared in this paper two major instruments to achieve environmental policy objectives.
We followed a formal and structured analytical approach to consider the interactions between
di®erent decision makers such as governments, ¯rms, regulators and ¯nanciers, and we took ac-
count of the recent debate on the lenders' liability solution (American Economic Review, June
2001). We considered a stylized but explicit extended liability system and modeled the rela-
tionship between the ¯nancier as a residual liable party and the ¯rms. Moreover, the model we
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developed includes political economy considerations, namely through the presence of asymmet-
ric information and capture features, and the instruments compared are in that sense imperfect
but realistic instruments. We represented our analysis through di®erent graphs allowing a more
intuitive discussion of the implications of using di®erent instruments. We showed how the cost
of the accident preventing activities, the social opportunity cost of public fund, the size of the
environmental damage, the bias factor in case of regulatory capture and the accident probability
can in°uence the choice between ex ante policy instruments such as a regulatory agency and ex
post policy instruments such as a liability system.
The instruments we characterized are sophisticated version of the statute-based regulatory
schemes and tort law systems. We considered incentive regulation rather than command and
control regulation to avoid giving at the outset an advantage to liability systems in terms of
more adequate exploitation of the decentralized and asymmetric distribution of informations.
Similarly, we considered an extended strict liability system to avoid giving at the outset an
advantage to the regulatory system which would otherwise be better able to internalize the
judgment-proof or limited liability constraints all policy implementation instruments must be
facing. In practice, these sophisticated versions of the two broad types of instruments we con-
sidered may not in general be the ones used at this time in any given jurisdictions. But we
nevertheless consider the exercise fruitful and useful given that more and more sophisticated
instruments are likely to gain in popularity to implement given policy objective, whether they
are related to environmental protection or not.14
We were also careful not to tilt the balance one way or another. For example, the regulatory
capture process is not modeled simply as a bribe system where the regulated ¯rms would \buy"
the decisions of the regulators but rather as a tendency for regulators to be over sensitive to
or to put too much emphasis on the interests of regulated ¯rms. Our captured regulator uses
the proper social welfare function except for a larger weight given to the ¯rms' rents or supra
competitive pro¯ts. This overweighing of the ¯rms' rents implies that the captured regulator
will overprotect the environment in order to allow ¯rms to capture larger informational rents.
14See Boyer and La®ont (1999) for a theoretical model of the pros and cons of the emergence of incentive
regulation in environmental policy.
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So rather than letting the environment unprotected in order to allow ¯rms to increase their
pro¯ts, a popular version of the capture argument, our captured regulator tend to make the
protection of the environment stricter because higher protection standard are conducive to higher
informational rents.
Without recalling all the results of thepaper, it is useful to mention some of the most important.
First, larger values of the social opportunity cost of public funds favors an extended liability or
full insurance regime as the preferred instrument. Lower values of the cost of reducing the prob-
ability of accident favors the regulation subject to capture regime. More costly environmental
accidents favors the captured regulator regime and the critical level of that cost at which the
switch occurs depends on the di®erential cost between high and low prevention: the higher this
di®erential cost, the higher that critical level. As the regulatory capture bias factor increases
above a critical value which increases with the social cost of public funds, the captured regulator
begins inducing the ¯rm to choose a high level of prevention and reduce the probability of an
accident but in so doing lets the ¯rm obtain a costly informational rent. In such a context, the
captured regulator moves away from the social optimum under moral hazard while the private
¯nancier remains unwilling to induce a high level of care. The private ¯nancier under extended
liability or compulsory full insurance becomes therefore the preferred instrument.
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APPENDIX
From Boyer and Porrini (2001), we have the following. The benevolent regulator will induce the
¯rm to exert a high level of accident preventing activities if and only if
¸
1 + ¸
R + ¢Ã · (p` ¡ ph)d; (1)
and will then let the ¯rm operate if and only if
2¹¼ ¡ 2F ¡ phd ¡ ¢Ã ¡ ¸1 + ¸R ¸ 0: (2)
Otherwise, she prefers that the ¯rm exert a low care level and will then let the ¯rm operate if
and only if
2¹¼ ¡ 2F ¡ p`d ¸ 0: (3)
The private ¯nancier, banker or insurer, under the extended liability and full insurance regime,
will induce the ¯rm to exert a high level of accident preventing activities if and only if
R + ¢Ã · (p` ¡ ph)d; (4)
and will then ¯nance the ¯rm if and only if
2¹¼ ¡ 2F ¡ phd ¡ ¢Ã ¡ R ¸ 0: (5)
Otherwise, she prefers that the ¯rm exert a low care level and will then ¯nance if and only if
(3) is satis¯ed. The captured regulator will induce the ¯rm to exert a high level of accident
preventing activities if and only if
1 + ¸ ¡ K
1 + ¸
R + ¢Ã · (p` ¡ ph)d; (6)
and will then let the ¯rm operate if and only if
2¹¼ ¡ 2F ¡ phd ¡ ¢Ã ¡ 1 + ¸ ¡ K1 + ¸ R ¸ 0: (7)
Otherwise, she prefers that the ¯rm exert a low care level and will then let the ¯rm operate if
and only if (3) is satis¯ed.
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FIGURE 2
[¼L = 5; ¼H = 10; µ = 0:5; F = 5; ph = 0:05; p` = 0:3; d = 20; K = 1:2]
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FIGURE 3
[¼L = 5; ¼H = 10; µ = 0:5; F = 5; ph = 0:05; p` = 0:1; K = 1:2; ¸ = 0:3]
-¢Ã
6
0
¼H
d
30
0.1
50
1
(4)(5) (2) (6)(1)
©1
-
¡
©2
35
FIGURE 4
[¼L = 5; ¼H = 10; µ = 0:5; F = 5; ph = 0:05; p` = 0:1; d = 20; ¢Ã = 0:6]
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FIGURE 5
[¼L = 5; ¼H = 10; F = 5; ph = 0:05; p` = 0:1; d = 20; K = 1:2; ¢Ã = 0:6]
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